We investigate the problem of reordering agents starting from an existing queue. First, we introduce four important axioms of the problem, budget balance (BB), outcome efficiency (OE), strategyproofness (SP), and individual rationality (IR). Unfortunately, it is easy to show that these four...

We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler [22]) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though there is no mechanism in...

In the standard independent private values (IPV)model, each bidder’s beliefs about the values of any other bidder is represented by a unique prior. In this paper we relax this assumption and study the question of auction design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity: bidders have an...

Online auctions with a fixed end-time often experience a sharp increase in bidding towards the end despite using a proxy-bidding format. We provide a novel explanation of this phenomenon under private values. We study a correlated private values environment in which the seller bids in her own...

We derive necessary and suffcient conditions for data sets composed of state-contingent prices and consumption to be consistent with two prominent models of decision making under ambiguity: variational preferences and smooth ambiguity. The revealed preference conditions for the maxmin expected...

We characterize all anonymous VCG mechanisms by using queue efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals. By additionally imposing independence axioms, introduced by Chun (2006a) and Maniquet (2003), we characterize the pivotal and the reward-based pivotal mechanisms in the class...

We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler in Q J Econ 92:671–687, <CitationRef CitationID="CR31">1978</CitationRef>) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though...</citationref>

We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of forming links are publicly known but an individual's benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a mechanism which not only ensures that an efficient network always forms in equilibrium but also ensures that...