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Morelli, Massimo - In: Rivista di Politica Economica (2012) 3, pp. 7-25

This paper proposes a theoretical explanation for the incremental integration path of Europe until the Monetary Union … time. The dynamic partition function game suggests that the presence of externalities across coalitions affects the timing … of admission of different players, the equilibrium coalition structure, and the equilibrium length of the admission game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858738

Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies

Gomes, Armando R; Jehiel, Philippe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper considers the efficiency and convergence properties of dynamic processes of social and economic interactions, such as exchange economies, multilateral negotiations, merger and divestiture transactions, or legislative bargaining. The key general feature of the economy is that agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792299

How Global Rules are established and stabilized

Siebert, Horst - Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) - 2007

This paper analyzes how international rules are established and stabilized, i.e. how an international institutional order develops. Rules emerge mainly through learning from negative experience and serve to reduce transaction costs. The paper looks at mechanisms that stabilize rule systems, at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755258

Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution Policies

Drazen, Allan; Limão, Nuno - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We consider a bargaining model of the interaction between a government and interest groups in which, unlike existing models, neither side is assumed to have all the bargaining power. The government will then find it optimal to constrain itself in the use of transfer policies to improve its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504570

Imperfect Monitoring and the Free-rider Problem in Tariff Lobbying.

Akhand, H.A. - School of Economics, UNSW Business School - 1999

This paper extends the infinitely repeated tariff lobbying game of Pecorino [8] to allow for imperfect monitoring, and revisits the question of how an industry's ability to maintain a cooperative outcome is affected by the number of firms in the industry. The paper demonstrated that Pecorino [8]...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478635

Challenge, Prevention and Response: Game-Theoretical Perspectives on Breakdown and Survival of Democracy.

Capoccia, G. - European Institute - Political and Social Sciences - 1999

The paper presents in a simple model the possible choices and constraints facing democratic governments when confronting an anti-democratic party challenge that is able to seriously endanger the survival of the democratic system.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486878

Persuasion as a Contest

Skaperdas, Stergios; Vaidya, Samarth - Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine - 2007

From marketing and advertising to political campaigning and court proceedings, contending parties expend resources to persuade an audience of the correctness of their view. We examine how the probability of persuading the audience depends on the resources expended by the parties, so that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970910

Bargaining Versus Fighting

Skaperdas, Stergios - Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine - 2006

I examine the determinants of conflict and settlement by embedding probabilistic contests in a bargaining framework. Different costly enforcement efforts (e.g., arming, litigation expenditures) induce different disagreement points and Pareto frontiers. After examining the incentives for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977974

A Consistent Allocation Rule: Non-emptiness, Reductions, Domination and Axiomatization

Chung, Ling-Yun; Liao, Yu-Hsien - In: Review of Economics & Finance 4 (2014) November, pp. 61-74

Since an extended core violates related properties of consistency, this paper proposes the concept of pseudo core. By focusing on the agents and the operational levels simultaneously, an extended reduction is also introduced to axiomatize the pseudo core. Furthermore, this paper adopts the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096958

Electoral Competition amongst Citizen-candidates and Downsian Politicians

Dziubinski, Marcin; Roy, Jaideep - Department of Economics, Management School - 2008

In this paper we study a model of political competition where citizens vote sincerely and candidates may be either citizens or Downsian politicians. The model extends the citizen-candidate model proposed by Osborne and Slivinski [1996] by including Downsian politicians similar to those studied...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165334