When the government gives a grant to a private charitable organization, do the donors to that organization give less? If they do, is it because the grants crowd out donors who feel they gave through taxes (classic crowd out), or is it because the grant crowds out the fund-raising of the...

The genuine problem of governance is one that pays equal attention to both incentive and knowledge issues in private and public contexts. This work brings together Austrian, Public Choice and theory of the firm insights to address such problem. By taking into account incentives and knowledge, it...

The Paper gives a brief overview over the social economy in Ireland, presenting this against the background of the countries history and social structure

Many organizations have budgets that expire at the end of the fiscal year. Faced with uncertainty over future spending demands, these organizations have an incentive to build up a rainy day fund over the first part of the year. If demand does not materialize, they must rush to spend these...

We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing and efficient. This...

Work integration social enterprises (WISE) are under pressure in two different regards. On the one hand, they have to participate in the market and compete with other firms, ensuring that they are sustainable in terms of prices, costs and quality. On the other hand, they endeavour to offer a...

Taking evolutionary view of markets, Harold Demsetz hypothesized that firms differ persistently in efficiency and that industry concentration results from growth of efficient firms at the expense of inefficient ones. We test the hypothesis with high quality microdata from the US hospital...