Similar Search Results

Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents

Fudenberg, Drew; Kreps, David M. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1987

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748980

On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements

Fudenberg, Drew; Kreps, David M.; Levine, David K. - UCLA Department of Economics - 1986

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828276

On the robustness of equilibrium refinements

Fudenberg, Drew; Kreps, David M.; Levine, David K. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 44 (1988) 2, pp. 354-380

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153917

Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria

Fudenberg, Drew; Kreps, David M. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 8 (1995) 1, pp. 20-55

A group of individuals repeatedly plays a fixed extensive-form game, using past play to forecast future actions. Each (asymptotically) maximizes his own immediate expected payoff, believing that others' play corresponds to the historical frequencies of past play. Because players observe only the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009195061