This work aims to study the effects of credit-market imperfection on the convergence of the cfa zone to the frontier growth rate. It focuses on the fact that a less efficient credit market is a constraint that prevents these countries to benefit from technology transfer and causes them to...

This paper analyses the effect of short term debt on equityholders' risk taking decisions. We show that if short term debt limits the expropriation of debtholders, it also implies a lower leverage, which prevents the firm from increasing tax shields. We then examine the incentive of...

Cet article a pour objectif d'étudier les effets de l'imperfection du marché du crédit sur la convergence des pays de la zone CFA vers la frontière de croissance mondiale. Afin de mettre l'accent sur le fait qu'un marché du crédit moins performant constitue une contrainte qui empêche ces...

A principal offers bilateral contracts to a set of agents organized in a network conveying synergies, in a context where agents' efforts are observable and where the principal's objective increases with the sum of efforts. We characterize optimal contracts as a function of agents' positions on...

We study network games under strategic complementarities. Agents are embedded in a fixed network. They choose a positive, continuous action and interact with their network neighbors. Interactions are positive and actions are bounded from above. We first derive new sufficient conditions for...

This paper explores the effect of moral hazard on both risk-taking and informal risk-sharing incentives. Two agents invest in their own project, each choosing a level of risk and effort, and share risk through transfers. This can correspond to farmers in developing countries, who share risk and...

This paper brings into focus a link between the investment and financing decisions of a firm which has an access to costly debt financing. Our analysis shows that lump-sum debt issuance costs play a prominent role in a determination of the optimal investment strategy. Faced with larger lump-sum...

Early regulator interventions into problem banks are one of the key suggestions of Basel II. However, no guidance is given on their design. To fill this gap, we outline an incentive-based preventive supervision strategy that eliminates bad asset management in banks. Two supervision techniques...