We develop a two-factor, two-sector trade model of monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution. Firms' profits and sizes may increase or decrease with market integration depending on the degree of asymmetry between countries. The country in which capital is relatively...

We develop a two-factor, two-sector trade model of monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution. Firms' profits and sizes may increase or decrease with market integration depending on the degree of asymmetry between countries. The country in which capital is relatively...

We modify Paul Krugman’s (1991) ‘Core–Periphery’ model by replacing the traditional competitive sector with a monopolistically competitive one. We show that the structure of spatial equilibria remains the same as in the original model. This result continues to hold true under Cournot or...

We study a multidimensional screening problem with minimal restrictions on valuations. Our ?-relaxation of the constraints excludes bunching and cycles in the graph of active incentive-compatibility constraints. Therefore, the Lagrange multipliers do exist and enable us in characterizing...

Examining a standard monopolistic competition model with unspecified utility/cost functions, we find necessary and sufficient conditions on their elasticities for welfare losses to arise from trade or market expansion. Two numerical examples explain the losses (under unrealistic elasticities).

We generalize the usual screening approach and conditions for efficiency-at-the-top and acyclic property from linear to fixed-plus-separable or concave costs and multidimensional commodities. But under non-concave costs, like capacity constraints, an example shows a cycle in the solution graph....

We propose a general model of monopolistic competition and derive a complete characterization of the market equilibrium using the concept of Relative Love for Variety. When the RLV increases with individual consumption, the market generates pro-competitive effects. When it decreases, the market...

We study general discrete-types multidimensional screening without any noticeable restrictions on valuations, using instead epsilon-relaxation of the incentive-compatibility constraints. Any active (becoming equality) constraint can be perceived as "envy" arc from one type to another, so the set...