We consider the asymptotic value of two person zero sum repeated games with general evaluations of the stream of stage payoffs. We show existence for incomplete information games, splitting games and absorbing games. The technique of proof consists in embedding the discrete repeated game into a...

Cet article met en évidence les lacunes du scrutin majoritaire à un ou à deux tours en théorie et en pratique, se reposant sur l'histoire récente des élections présidentielles françaises et de résultats expérimentaux. Et il propose un remède : plus d'information doit être demandée...

New relaxations of the Nash equilibrium concept are shown to exist in any strategic game with discontinuous payoff functions. The new concepts are used (1) to show the equivalence between Reny's better-reply security condition [28] and Simon-Zame's endogenous tie-breaking rule equilibrium...

Several relaxations of Nash equilibrium are shown to exist in strategic games with discontinuous payoff functions. Those relaxations are used to extend and unify several recent results and link Reny's better-reply security condition [Reny, P.J. (1999). On the existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy...

Classifying and ranking wines has been a favorite activity of men and women since timeimmemorial. The intent of this article is to explain how and why the traditional methods for amalgamating the grades fail and how and why a new approach - majority judgment - does the job best.

We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time admits an "epsilon" equilibrium in randomized stopping times. We provide a condition that ensures the existence of an "epsilon" equilibrium in nonrandomized stopping times.

Ce document de Recherche a été réalisé dans le Cadre du Projet Scientifique Collectif, un travail de recherche d'une année dans le cycle d'ingénieur de l'Ecole Polytechnique. Profitant des échéances électorales des années 2011 et 2012 (la primaire citoyenne de l'automne 2011 et...

Several relaxations of Nash equilibrium are shown to exist in strategic games with discontinuous payoff functions. Those relaxations are used to extend and unify several recent results and link Reny's better-reply security condition [Reny, P.J. (1999). On the existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy...

We provide a numerical procedure to compute uniform (convex) approximations {f_{r}} of the convex envelope f of a rational fraction f, on a compact semi-algebraic set D. At each point x in K=co(D), computing f_{r}(x) reduces to solving a semidefinite program. We next characterize the convex hull...

New relaxations of the Nash equilibrium concept are shown to exist in any strategic game with discontinuous payoff functions. The new concepts are used (1) to show the equivalence between Reny's better-reply security condition [28] and Simon-Zame's endogenous tie-breaking rule equilibrium...