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This paper extends the literature on equilibria with coordination failures to arbitrary convex sets of admissible prices. This makes it possible to address coordination failures for cases with price indexation or more general price linkages between commodities. We introduce a new equilibrium...
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Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterative methods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed in the literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both the number of...
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In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restrictions and that prices adjust infinitely fast to their equilibrium values. Price rigidities may cause that a competitive equilibrium cannot be attained, and rationing on net demands or supplies is needed to clear...
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In this paper we generalize the concept of a non-transferable utility game by introducing the concept of a socially structured game. A socially structured game is given by a set of players, a possibly empty collection of internal organizations on any subset of players, for any internal...
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This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Social Choice and Welfare', 2005, 24, 439-454.<P> Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterativemethods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed inthe...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256523
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Games and Economic Behavior', 2007, 59, 85-104. <P> We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the...</p>
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