The problem of how to rationally aggregate probability measures occurs in particular (i) when a group of agents, each holding probabilistic beliefs, needs to rationalise a collective decision on the basis of a single ‘aggregate belief system’ and (ii) when an individual whose belief system...

Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi (Economic Theory, 48:341--375, 2011) have recently proposed a very general axiomatisation of preferences in the presence of ambiguity, viz. Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean (MBA) preference orderings. This paper investigates the...

We prove a lifting theorem, in the sense of Robinsonian nonstandard analysis, for the G-expectation. Herein, we use an existing discretization theorem for the G-expectation by T. Fadina and F. Herzberg (Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 503, (2014)).

Amartya Sen (1970) has shown that three natural desiderata for social choice rules are inconsistent: universal domain, respect for unanimity, and respect for some minimal rights — which can be interpreted as either expert rights or liberal rights. Dietrich and List (2008) have generalised this...

For a continuous-time financial market with a single agent, we establish equilibrium pricing formulae under the assumption that the dividends follow an exponential Lévy process. The agent is allowed to consume a lump at the terminal date; before, only flow consumption is allowed. The agent's...

The theory of Boolean algebras can be fruitfully applied to judgment aggregation: Assuming universality, systematicity and a sufficiently rich agenda, there is a correspondence between (i) non-trivial deductively closed judgment aggregators and (ii) Boolean algebra homomorphisms defined on the...

This article investigates the representative-agent hypothesis for an infinite population which has to make a social choice from a given finite-dimensional space of alternatives. It is assumed that some class of admissible strictly concave utility functions is exogenously given and that each...

The relationship between propositional model theory and social decision making via premise-based procedures is explored. A one-to-one correspondence between ultrafilters on the population set and weakly universal, unanimity-respecting, systematic judgment aggregation functions is established....

Eliaz (2004) has established a ``meta-theorem'' for preference aggregation which implies both Arrow's Theorem (1963) and the Gibbard- Satterthwaite Theorem (1973, 1975). This theorem shows that the driving force behind impossibility theorems in preference aggregation is the mutual exclusiveness...

It is known that a combination of the Maccheroni-Marinacci-Rustichini (2006) axiomatisation of variational preferences with the Föllmer-Schied (2002,2004) representation theorem for concave monetary utility functionals provides an (individual) decision-theoretic foundation for convex risk...