We demonstrate a density projection approximation method for solving resource management problems with imperfect state information. The method expands the set of partially-observed Markov decision process (POMDP) problems that can be solved with standard dynamic programming tools by addressing...

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In...

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the...

We consider a game of strategic experimentation in the presence of competition between two agents. Each agent faces a two-armed bandit problem in which she continually chooses between her private, risky arm and a common, safe arm. An agent has exclusive access to her private arm. However, only...

We consider the truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We show that a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each...

We survey the literature on multi-armed bandit models and their applications in economics. The multi-armed bandit problem is a statistical decision model of an agent trying to optimize his decisions while improving his information at the same time. This classic problem has received much...

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the...

A random variable (RV) X is given aminimum selling price $$S_U \left( X \right):=\mathop {\sup }\limits_x \left\{ {x + EU\left( {X - x} \right)} \right\}$$ and amaximum buying price $$B_p \left( X \right):=\mathop {\inf }\limits_x \left\{ {x + EP\left( {X - x} \right)} \right\}$$ whereU(·)...

A random variable (RV) X is given aminimum selling price <Equation ID="E1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"> $$S_U \left( X \right):=\mathop {\sup }\limits_x \left\{ {x + EU\left( {X - x} \right)} \right\}$$ </EquationSource> </Equation> and amaximum buying price <Equation ID="E2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"> $$B_p \left( X \right):=\mathop {\inf }\limits_x \left\{ {x + EP\left( {X - x} \right)} \right\}$$ </EquationSource> </Equation>...</equationsource></equation></equationsource></equation>

We demonstrate that one should not expect convergence of the proposals to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer in standard ultimatum games. First, imposing strict experimental control of the behavior of the receiving players and focusing on the behavior of the proposers, we show...