Bundle trading is a new trend in financial markets that allows traders to submit consolidated orders to sell and buy packages of assets. We propose a new formulation for portfolio bundle trading that extends the previous models of the literature through a more detailed representation of...

Online labor markets are platforms that facilitate Buyer-Determined (BD) auctions in which buyers can identify and hire service providers who bid to offer IT services. We examine the effect of bid visibility (i.e., open bid versus sealed bid) on the bidders’ entry strategies (number of...

This study theoretically presents a new auction design called "take-or-give auction." The auction solves the free-rider problem in the case of two symmetric and risk-neutral bidders competing for a good with countervailing positive externalities. The auction makes efficient allocation. Moreover,...

The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the primary auction used for monetizing the use of the Internet. It is well-known that truthtelling is not a dominant strategy in this auction and that inefficient equilibria can arise. Edelman et al. (2007) [11] and Varian (2007) [36] show that an...

The revenue function for a standard auction is typically asymmetric around the revenue maximizing reserve price. Thus, choosing a reserve price that is smaller than the revenue maximizing reserve price can result in a substantially different loss than choosing one that is larger by the same...

We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed-bid vs. closed clock vs. open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous vs. sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi-unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission...

In this paper we conduct an empirical investigation of a large-scale combinatorial auction (CA)--the Chilean auction for school meals in which the government procures half a billion dollars worth of meal services every year. Our empirical study is motivated by two fundamental aspects in the...

This paper studies optimal auction design with asymmetric linear financial externalities among bidders. When the matrix Γ that relates biddersʼ payoffs to their payments is nonsingular, the payment-related component in the design objective must equal a unique linear combination of its...