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Do Increases in Environmental Risk Reduce Welfare? A Dynamic Game Perspective

Benchekroun, Hassan; Long, Ngo Van - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2013

We consider the effect of an increase in the risk from pollution. We show that in the case of a flow pollution, when … the number of players is sufficiently large, the result of Bramoulle and Treich, showing that a marginal increase of risk … in the neighborhood of a risk-free world is welfare-improving, holds even when we consider non-marginal increases in risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183755

Applications of Dynamic Games to Global and Transboundary Environmental Issues: A Review of the Literature

Van Long, Ngo - In: Strategic Behavior and the Environment 2 (2012) 1, pp. 1-59

This paper surveys three areas of applications of dynamic games: (i) transboundary pollution, (ii) exploitation of transboundary resources, and (iii) problems of the developing world: capital flights, foreign aid, war and peace. A refresher section introduces the basic ideas and solution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010698743

Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach

Calvo, Emilio; Rubio, Santiago J. - Estructura de Recerca Interdisciplinar Comportament … - 2012

This article provides a survey of dynamic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs). The focus is on environmental problems that are caused by a stock pollutant as are the cases of the acid rain and climate change. For this reason, the survey only reviews the literature that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548942

Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach

Calvo, Emilio; Rubio, Santiago J. - In: International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 6 (2013) 4, pp. 289-339

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010696389

Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Benchekroun, H.; Ray Chaudhuri, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2012

Abstract: This paper shows that, if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect from a coalition, then the implementation of cleaner technologies may jeopardize the chances of reaching an international environmental agreement. The grand coalition may be destabilized by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090691

'The Voracity Effect' and Climate Change : The Impact of Clean Technologies

Benchekroun, H.; Ray Chaudhuri, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010

In the absence of a successful international cooperative agreement over the control of emissions there is a growing interest in the role that clean technologies may play to alleviate the climate change problem. Within a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, we investigate, analytically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091386

Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Benchekroun, H.; Ray Chaudhuri, A. - Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011093149

Transboundary pollution and clean technologies

Benchekroun, Hassan; Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita - In: Resource and Energy Economics 36 (2014) 2, pp. 601-619

Within a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, we investigate the impact of the adoption of a cleaner technology (i.e., a decrease in the emission to output ratio). We show that countries may respond by increasing their emissions resulting in an increase in the stock of pollution that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753153

A TIME-CONSISTENT AGREEMENT IN AN INTERREGIONAL DIFFERENTIAL GAME ON POLLUTION AND TRADE

CABO, FRANCISCO; ESCUDERO, ELENA; MARTÍN-HERRÁN, GUIOMAR - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 08 (2006) 03, pp. 369-393

This paper studies a transboundary pollution problem between two neighbour regions as a dynamic game. These two regions do not only share an environmental problem but they are also engaged in interregional trade. A good produced in one region is traded to the other which uses it as an input....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081032

Farsight and Myopia in a Transboundary Pollution Game

Benchekroun, Hassan; Martín-Herrán, Guiomar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2012

We study the impact of farsightedness in a transboundary pollution game; i.e. the ability of a country to forecast the relationship between current emissions and future levels of pollution and thus on future damages. We show that when all countries are farsighted their payos are larger than when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616507