We analyze an overlapping generations model of voting over ``reform projects''. These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later bring a payoff; consequently, older people are more conservative (against reforms) than younger ones. We show that if people...

Genetic tests can be expected to produce a large amount of economically important information in the future. What are the effects on a life insurance market if more information becomes available over time, for individuals and possibly also for insurers? Should people buy insurance before or...

We also explore the robustness of our model when second period valuations are correlated across individuals, and when each individual's first and second period types are correlated.

We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidatesʼ immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) as well as their policy positions, which are flexible. Candidates are uncertain about the...

We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences concerning an irreversible social decision. Voters can either implement the project in the first period, or they can postpone the decision to the second period. We analyze the effects of different...

We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences concerning an irreversible social decision. Voters can either implement the project in the first period, or they can postpone the decision to the second period. We analyze the effects of different...

We analyse the effects of regulations prohibiting the use of information to risk-rate premiums in a life insurance market. New information derived from genetic tests is likely to become increasingly relevant in the future. Many governments prohibit the use of this information, thereby generating...

This article analyzes the behavior of an oligopoly of risk-averse insurers that insure many consumers facing identical independent risks; however, the probability of a loss is ex ante not known with certainty. It is shown that there is a continuum of equilibria in the Bertrand game. The most...

We investigate the welfare effects of policies that increase voter turnout in costly voting models. In a generalized costly voting model, we show that if the electorate is sufficiently large, then increasing voter turnout is generically efficient. Increasing turnout in small elections is only...