We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of the whole group. The model assumes that...

This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address...

<Para ID="Par1">This paper reports a series of laboratory experiments intended to identify conditions that attenuate the overdissipation of rents typical of experimental contest games. We examine the influences on contestant behavior of the observability and timing of preceding bids, allocation rules for the...</para>

In this paper we bring a novel approach to the theory of tournament rankings. We combine two different theories that are widely used to establish rankings of populations after a given tournament. First, we use the statistical approach of paired comparison analysis to define the performance of a...

Bulow and Levin’s (<CitationRef CitationID="CR3">2006</CitationRef>) “Matching and Price Competition” studies a matching model in which hospitals compete for interns by offering wages. We relax the assumption of symmetric linear costs and compare the pricing equilibrium that results to the firm-optimal competitive equilibrium. With...</citationref>