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L'approche en termes de systèmes dynamiques de l'approximation stochastique est étendue au cas ou l'équation différentielle moyenne est remplacée par une inclusion différentielle. Le théorème de Benaim et Hirsch sur l'ensemble limite est étendu a ce cas. On étudie en détail les...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793450
Nous appliquons les résultats théoriques sur l'approximation stochastique et les inclusions differentielles développés dans Benaïm Hofbauer and Sorin (2003) à différentes procédures adapatatives utilisées en théorie des jeux en particulier: approchabilité classique et généralisées,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794088
We propose a new concept for the analysis of games, the TASP, which gives a precise prediction about non-equilibrium play in games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning. We show that, when players learn using weighted stochastic fictitious play and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005005931
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572817
Using an explicit representation in terms of the logit map we show, in a unilateral framework, that the time average of the replicator dynamics is a perturbed solution of the best reply dynamics.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707380
Using an explicit representation in terms of the logit map we show, in a unilateral framework, that the time average of the replicator dynamics is a perturbed solution of the best reply dynamics.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793161
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755729
We here establish an upper bound on the probability for deviations of a Markov population process from its mean-field approximation.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794172
We consider the framework of repeated two-person zero-sum games with lack of information on one side. We compare the equilibrium payoffs of the informed player in two cases: where he is facing either a) a single long-lived uninformed player, or b) a sequence of short-lived uninformed players. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371507
We introduce the concept of -consistent equilibrium where each player plays a -best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an -consistent equilibrium induces an -equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of -consistent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375588