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Opinion Pooling under Asymmetric Information

Dietrich, Franz - EconWPA - 2004

If each member of a group assigns a certain probability to a hypothesis, what probability should the collective as a whole assign? More generally, how should individual probability functions be merged into a single collective one? I investigate this question in case that the individual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412461

An Equilibrium Approach to the Aggregation of Beliefs

Jin, Yi; Zhang, Jianbo - In: Frontiers of Economics in China 8 (2013) 1, pp. 50-63

This paper presents a new answer to the old question of how to aggregate individual beliefs. We construct a model which allows agents to take arbitrage opportunities against the aggregated belief by making contingent claims against the states, and the aggregator (market maker) regulates the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895826

Foundations of ambiguity and economic modeling

Mukerji, Sujoy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2009

Are foundations of models of ambiguity-sensitive preferences too flawed to be usefully applied to economic models? Al …-Najjar and Weinstein do not apply to quite a few of the ambiguity preference models of more recent vintage, and therefore to that … extent do not undermine the foundational aspects or applicability of ambiguity models in general. Second, we argue the focus …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999235

Sharing risk and ambiguity

Rigotti, Luca; Shannon, Chris - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 5, pp. 2028-2039

We study the market implications of ambiguity in common models. We show that generic determinacy is a robust feature in … general equilibrium models that allow a distinction between ambiguity and risk. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594326

Bayesian group belief

Dietrich, Franz - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010

If a group is modelled as a single Bayesian agent, what should its beliefs be? I propose an axiomatic model that connects group beliefs to beliefs of the group members. The group members may have different information, different prior beliefs and even different domains (algebras) within which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744918

Opinion pooling on general agendas

Dietrich, Franz; List, Christian - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

How can different individuals’ probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Although there are several classic results on this problem, they all assume that the ‘agenda’of relevant events forms a -algebra, an overly demanding assumption for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746642

On Robust Constitution Design

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Gary-Bobo, Robert J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the distribution of preference types. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504542

The Calculus of Stonewalling.

Glazer, A.; Hassin, R. - California Irvine - School of Social Sciences - 2000

We consider a politician's choice of whether to be evaluated, as by subjecting himself to a detailed interview or by asking for the appointment of a special prosecutor. We find that both when politicians do and do not know the quality of their own actions, stable equilibria may exist in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486847

An Equilibrium for Games Played by Imperfect Organizations.

Eliaz, K. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 2001

This paper argues that when organizations are imperfect in the sense that members may make mistakes and messages may be distorted, then the inner structure of the organization should be explicitly modeled. This paper proposes a framework for studying games between imperfect organizations.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489264

Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland

Benz, Matthias; Alois Stutzer: - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

Public choice theory takes citizens as rationally ignorant about political issues, because the costs of being informed greatly exceed the utility individuals derive from it. The costs of information (supply side) as well as the utility of information (demand side), however, can vary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463547