The increasing attention of profit maximising corporations to corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a new stylized fact of the contemporary economic environment. In our theoretical analysis we model CSR adoption as the optimal response of a profit maximising firm to the competition of a not...

In our model of socially responsible (SR) product differentiation two duopolists (a zero profit socially concerned producer and a profit maximizing producer) compete over prices and (costly) “socially and environmentally responsible” features of their products under a given law of motion of...

The choice between performing a task today or procrastinating it until tomorrow or later is the building block of any economic action. In our paper we aim to enrich the theoretical literature on procrastination by outlining conditions for bad and good procrastination and looking at the special...

We outline a model in which preservation of UNESCO heritage sites is analyzed as a classical global public good problem where the decentralized Nash equilibrium yields suboptimal contribution vis-à-vis the Social Planner equilibrium. The absence of a Global Social Planner and the need of...

<em>La differenziazione etica del prodotto</em> - On ethical product differentiation, by Leonardo Becchetti and Nazaria Solferino The model investigates contagion effects in the production of fair trade goods within a mixed oligopoly with horizontal differentiation. In our theoretical framework the...

In this paper we outline a model of horizontal product differentiation where two duopolists a profit maximising producer (PMP) and a socially responsible fair trader (FT) producer compete over prices and (costly) socially and environmentally responsible features of their products. We analyse the...

In our model of ethical product differentiation two duopolists (a zero profit socially concerned producer and a profit maximizing producer) compete over prices and (costly) socially and environmentally responsible features of their products under a given law of motion of consumer habits. In a...

We document that being spectators (no effect on personal payoffs) and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders without information on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria after task performance to prefer rewarding talent (vis à vis effort, chance or strict...

We document with a randomized experiment that being spectators and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders with veil of ignorance on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria to prefer rewarding talent (vis-à-vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after...

We document with a randomized experiment that being spectators and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders with veil of ignorance on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria to prefer rewarding talent (vis à vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after...