In this article we study the implication of thresholds in preferences. To model this we extend the basic model of John and Pecchenino (1994) by allowing the current level of environmental quality to have a discrete impact on how an agent trades off future consumption and environmental quality....

In this article we study the implication of thresholds in preferences. To model this we extend the basic model of John and Pecchenino (1994) by allowing the current level of environmental quality to have a discrete impact on how an agent trades off future consumption and environmental quality....

In this article we extend the recent literature on overlapping generations and pollution by allowing each generation’s utility to depend on past levels of pollution. To conform with the literature on habit in consumption we call this extension habit in pollution. Habit in pollution can...

In this article we extend the recent literature on overlapping generations with a pollution sector by allowing generations to have a certain pollution perception with regards to the stock of pollution. Pollution perception, assumed to be part of the generations' preferences, can be either a...

In this article we extend the recent literature on overlapping generations and pollution by allowing generations to perceive the level of pollution differently than the actual level of pollution. We call this pollution perception. Pollution perception can visualize itself as either a concern for...

In this article we study the implication of thresholds in preferences. To model this we extend the basic model of John and Pecchenino (1994) by allowing the current level of environmental quality to have a discrete impact on how an agent trades off future consumption and environmental quality....

This paper presents one kind of heterogeneous strategies in some differential games where one player plays open-loop strategy and the other one plays Markovian strategy. On top of the stationary path, this kind of strategies enable the study of trajectory dynamics, even for asymmetric players’...

In our paper we show that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure tax competition. The divergence is even worse when the competing jurisdictions differ in...

One family of heterogeneous strategies in differential games with (a)symmetric players is developed in which one player adopts an anticipating open-loop strategy and the other adopts a standard Markovian strategy. Via conjecturing principle, the anticipating open-loop strategic player plans his...

In this paper we present a differential game model of two firms with different technologies producing the same good and selling in the same world market. The firm equipped with advanced technology is deciding whether to outsource parts of its production to the home country of its competitor,...