In this paper we generalize the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixed-duopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

Vegyes oligopóliumoknak nevezzük az olyan piacszerkezeteket, amelyek esetében a magánvállalatok mellett állami vállalatok is tevékenykednek. A vegyes oligopóliumokban az állami vállalatok részben vagy egészében a társadalmi többletet kívánják maximalizálni. Olyan vegyes...

In this paper we extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixedduopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

We determine the endogenous order of moves in which the firms set their prices in the framework of a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly. A three-period timing game that determines the period in which the firms announce their prices precedes the price-setting stage. We show for the...

We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether...

We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity. The basic concept is the notion of a "cyclic permutation domain" which arises by fixing one particular ordering of alternatives and including all its cyclic permutations. The cyclic permutation domains...

We determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed price-setting duopoly. In contrast to the existing literature on mixed oligopolies we establish the payoff equivalence of the games with an exogenously given order of moves. Hence, it does not matter whether one becomes a leader or a...

The relationship of managerial bonuses and profit maximization is interesting both from an economic and a managerial viewpoint. Our contribution to this literature is showing that progressive managerial bonuses can increase profits in a spatial Bertrand competition, and furthermore they can help...

A kiskereskedelmi árrögzítés évtizedek óta vitatott kérdés a közgazdasági elméletben. Az Egyesült Államok legfelsőbb bíróságának közelmúltbeli döntése - megszüntetve az ilyen típusú árkorlátozások önmagában törvénytelennek ítélését - ismételten felhívta a...

In this article we examine the effects of third degree price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies. We show that the average price is not affected by the extent of price discrimination. We find that the asymmetry between firms is reflected only by the output produced for the...