In the present paper, we adopt the collective approach to consumer behavior - which supposes that each household member is characterized by his/her own preferences and that the decision process results in Pareto-efficient outcomes - and assume, in addition, that agents are egoistic and...

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size $y$. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters $\lambda$ that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an...

In this paper, we present a collective model of household demand based on Pareto-efficiency. In addition, we suppose that (a) each household member is egoistic and consumption is purely private, (b) there is a set of distribution factors and (c) there is one exclusive good. Then we derive the...

In this paper, we suggest a collective model with parents and (young) children. We identify and estimate scale economies in households and the sharing rule between husband, wife and children. While adult shares and economies of scale are identi?ed thanks to the estimation of individual Engel...

We examine the relative merits of targeting children within the household through price subsidies and cash transfers. To do so, we model the behavior of a household composed of one adult and one child. We then show that ‘favorable’ distortions from price subsidies may allow redistributing...

The present paper develops a collective model of labor supply with domestic production. It is shown that the structural components of the model can be identified without using a distribution factor, thereby generalizing the initial results of Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997). The...

Since the seminal work of MINCER [1962] and BECKER [1965], the interest for the study of individual and household time allocation has been on the rise. In this introduction, we provide a brief, impressionistic survey of this large and rapidly growing literature and then discuss the organization...

We consider the decisions of a married couple in a risky environment. The distribution of spouses’ bargaining power may change as a result of new outside opportunities that become available to them, so that individual consumption may fluctuate over time. This is what we call “bargaining...

We investigate the empirical content of the Nash solution to two-player bargaining games. The bargaining environment is described by a set of variables that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e. whether an agreement is...