We consider a mechanism design problem in economies with increasing returns. We construct a new class of rules, called w-hybrid rules, and characterize them by strategy-proofness, anonymity, envy-freeness, consumer sovereignty, and non-bossiness. We show that w-hybrid rules improve the supremal...

We consider a mechanism design problem in economies with increasing returns. We construct a new class of rules, called w-hybrid rules, and characterize them by strategy-proofness, budget-balance, anonymity, envy-freeness, consumer sovereignty and non-bossiness. We also show that w-hybrid rules...

In this paper, we consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, we also give a characterization of the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule, as the only rule that...

We study strategy-proof and fair mechanism in Shapley and Scarf (1974) economies. We introduce a new condition for fairness, we call envy-freeness for equal position. It requires that if one agent prefers the otherfs allocation, he should not prefer it to his allocation that is assigned at the...

We consider a mechanism design problem for the provision of a binary excludable public good. We characterize the augmented serial rules [Ohseto (2005)] by strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and access independence. This result is the positive answer to the first question left by Ohseto (2005)....