We study airport competition when some types of commercial services, such as car parking or car rental, may be offered at the time of air ticket purchase through the Internet, in order to stimulate aviation demand. We find that airports set a lower aviation charge than they would have levied in...

We study airport competition when vertically differentiated products may be strategically offered at the time of ticket purchase through the Internet: a base product Ð the flight Ð and a composite one Ð the flight plus some premium commercials (PCs), as car parking, car rental or hotel...

We study airport competition when vertically differentiated products may be strategically offered at the time of ticket purchase through the Internet: a base product Ð the flight Ð and a composite one Ð the flight plus some premium commercials (PCs), as car parking, car rental or hotel...

The paper examines the strategic vertical relationship between network and regional airlines. We develop a model to illustrate how network airlines can use the contractual relationship with regional airlines as an efficient tool to simultaneously drive out inefficient network airlines and also...

We study airport pricing with aeronautical and concession activities, incorporating a positive relationship between delay and consumption of concession goods, and the effect of passenger types. We assume that as congestion increases, dwell time increases - and the money spent in concession...

This paper analyzes the effects of cooperation between a hub-and-spoke airline and a high-speed rail (HSR) operator when the hub airport may be capacity-constrained. We find that such cooperation reduces traffic in markets where prior modal competition occurs, but may increase traffic in other...

This paper investigates contracts between airports and airlines, in the context of two competing facilities and three types of agreements. The downstream market consists in a route operated by one leader and n−1 followers competing àla Stackelberg in each facility. We develop a multistage...

We develop a test for vertical collusion between airports and airlines in the case of two different scenarios. In the first scenario there is one airport and one airline; this intends to depict the case of airports that do not compete with any other one. In the second, we consider two competing...