We show that in a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with unknown demand, the optimal information disclosure policy of an informed benevolent planner is to fully inform one of the duopolists and disclose no information to the other one. We discuss possible extensions of the result.

We show that in a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with unknown demand, the optimal information disclosure policy of an informed benevolent planner is to fully inform one of the duopolists and disclose no information to the other one. We discuss possible extensions of the result.

n this paper we investigate the implementation problem arising when some of the players are ``faulty" in the sense that they fail to act optimally. The exact number and identity of the faulty players is unknown to the planner and to the nonfaulty players, but it is common knowledge that there...

This paper argues that when organizations are imperfect in the sense that members may make mistakes and messages may be distorted, then the inner structure of the organization should be explicitly modeled. This paper proposes a framework for studying games between imperfect organizations.

Nash equilibrium is often interpreted as a steady state in which each player holds the correct expectations about the other players` behavior and acts rationally. This paper investigates the robustness of this interpretation when players` preferences are affected by their forecasts about the...

This paper shows that both Arrow`s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem follow from a single impossibility theorem. This theorem states that two properties - Pareto efficiency and a condition called Preference Reversal - lead to the dictatorship result.

If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed...

The article shows how Jean-François Mertens contributed to the development of game theory and microeconomics as we know them today. Along about 80 articles, Mertens?s topics go from the formulation of Bayesian decision making in games with incomplete information to the foundations of cost...