Working with a small-scale calibrated New-Keynesian model, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) find that the reduction in trend inflation during Volcker's mandate was a key factor behind the Great Moderation. We revisit this finding with an estimated New-Keynesian model with trend inflation and no...

The paper describes the characteristics of the market for private placements and discusses the necessary conditions for their uptake in Europe. A private placement is a method of financing used mainly by medium-sized companies which, unable to access the public bond market, turn to one or more...

We combine an estimated monetary policy rule featuring time-varying trend inflation and stochastic coefficients with a medium scale New Keynesian framework calibrated on the U.S. economy. We find the impact of variations in trend inflation on the likelihood of equilibrium determinacy to be both...

We study the properties of the optimal nominal interest rate policy under different levels of price indexation. In our model indexation regulates the sources of inflation persistence. When indexation is zero, the inflation gap is purely forward- looking and inflation persistence depends only on...

This note shows that full price indexation is not optimal in the long-run, in the New Keynesian model under trend inflation and price staggering à la Calvo. Moreover, we show that more price stickiness may increase steady state welfare, if price indexation is partial.

This note shows that full price indexation is not optimal in the long-run, in the New Keynesian model under trend inflation and price staggering à la Calvo. Moreover, we show that more price stickiness may increase steady state welfare, if price indexation is partial.

TBA

This paper shows how in Medicare Part D insurers' gaming of the subsidy paid to low-income enrollees distorts premiums and raises the program cost. Using plan-level data from the first five years of the program, I find multiple instances of pricing strategy distortions for the largest insurers....

This paper presents evidence on the perverse trade-off that first price auctions induce between low prices at the awarding stage and poor ex post performance when bids are not binding commitments. By exploiting the different timing with which first price auctions were introduced in Italy to...