We consider a model of an information network where nodes can fail and transmission of information is costly. The formation of paths in such networks is modeled as the Nash equilibrium of an N player routing game. The task of obtaining this equilibrium is shown to be NP-Hard. We derive...

We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent.(2) Link formation should be costly.(3) The class of...

We consider game theoretic models of social network formation.In this paper we limit our investigation to game theoretic models of network formation that are based on individual actions only.Our approach is based on three simple and realistic principles: (1) Link formation is a binary process of...

We examine the strong pairwise stability concept in network formation theory under collective network benefits.Strong pairwise stability considers a pair of players to add a link through mutual consent while permitting them to unilaterally delete any subset of links under their control.We...

Recently a variety of link-based stability concepts have emerged in the literature on game theoretic models of social network formation.We investigate two basic formation properties that establish equivalence between some well known types of stable networks and their natural extensions.These...

In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi's model of network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks of this setting. We also present some results on efficient networks.

Social networks, be it on the internet or in real life, facilitate information flows. We model this by giving agents incentives to link with others and receive information through those links. We consider networks where agents have an incentive to confirm the information they receive from...