We study mechanism design in non-Bayesian settings of incomplete information, when the designer has no information about the players, and the players have arbitrary, heterogeneous, first-order, and possibilistic beliefs about their opponents' payoff types.

Shimoji and Watson (1998) prove that a strategy of an extensive game is rationalizable in the sense of Pearce if and only if it survives the maximal elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. Briefly, this process iteratively eliminates conditionally dominated strategies according to a...

We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. We thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very adversarial collusion model, where the players can partition themselves...

In a naked credit default swap (CDS) position, a party pays an income stream to a seller of protection to swap away default risk on an underlying defaultable security without actually holding this reference instrument. Using mark-to-market returns on a large cross section of CDS positions, held...

Lease expiration management (LEM) in the apartment industry aims to control the number of lease expirations and thus achieve maximal revenue growth. We examine rental rate strategies in the context of LEM for apartment buildings that offer a single lease term and face demand uncertainty. We show...

Whereas the technical feasibility of solar water heaters (SWHs) has long been established, the economic feasibility of SWHs in regional China remains to be examined. This paper constructs cost models to calculate costs per unit energy saving of SWHs in 27 Chinese provincial capital cities. The...