Showing 1 - 10 of 191
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005676180
We analyse a model of vertical differentiation focusing on the trade-off between entering early and exploiting monopoly power with a low quality, versus waiting and enjoying a dominant market position with a superior product. We show that, in a relevant parameter region, there exists a unique...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005800570
We consider a market for vertically differentiated goods where firms enter over time, after having developed innovations characterised by different quality levels. We show that patent height and length interact to determine the ultimate emergence of duopoly. In general, imposing quality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005800574
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Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is socially efficient.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005260570
Many couples do not sign prenuptial agreements, even though this often leads to costly and inefficient litigation in case of divorce. In this paper we show that strategic reasons may prevent agents from signing a prenuptial agreement. Partners which have high productivity in marital activities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407538
This paper tackles the issue of unverifiable quality of after-sales insurance services, such as a prompt reimbursement of damages. A dynamic model is introduced in order to allow reputation to emerge as a means of disciplining insurance firms to deliver high quality. The equilibrium of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166271
We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through their (costly) deceptive advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259275
We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through (costly) deceptive advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low quality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010800999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010876434