We modify the payment rule of the standard divide the dollar (DD) game by introducing a second stage and thereby resolve the multiplicity problem and implement equal division of the dollar in equilibrium. In the standard DD game, if the sum of players’ demands is less than or equal to a...

We consider estate division problems and show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider (estate division) rules...

We introduce a minimal notion of altruism and use it to refine Nash equilibria in normal form games. We provide three independent existence proofs, relate minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium to other equilibrium concepts, conduct an in-depth sensitivity analysis, and provide examples where...

Bargaining theory has a conceptual dichotomy at its core: according to one view, the utilities in the bargaining problem are meaningless numbers (v-N.M utilities), while according to another view they do have concrete meaning (willingness to pay). The former position is assumed by the Nash and...

We consider an economy in which there is an infinite stream of pies, each of size one, one in every period. For each agent, the per-period utility function, which is defined on that period's consumption, is determined by the previous period's consumption. We describe specifications of this model...

“Randomized dictatorship,” one of the simplest ways to solve bargaining situations, works as follows: a fair coin toss determines the “dictator”—the player to be given his first-best payoff. The two major bargaining solutions, that of Nash (Econometrica 18:155–162, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">1950</CitationRef>) and that of...</citationref>

I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidderʼs valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. Under certain distributional assumptions, the...

I study a symmetric 2-bidder IPV first-price auction prior to which one bidder can offer his rival a bribe in exchange for the latterʼs abstention. I focus on pure and undominated strategies, and on continuous monotonic equilibria—equilibria in which the bribing function is continuous and...

A unique bargaining solution satisfies restricted monotonicity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of equivalent utility representations, and symmetry—the disagreement solution. It is also the unique bargaining solution that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives,...

We clarify the sufficient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of Rachmilevitch (2013). Rachmilevitch (2013), henceforth R13, studies the following game. Two ex ante identical players are about to participate in an independent-private-value first-price, sealed bid auction...