Infrastructure networks are a key feature of an economy. Their functionality depends on the connectivity and sizes of different components and they face a variety of threats, from natural disasters to intelligent attacks. How should networks be defended and designed to ensure the best functionality?

We study a non-symmetric variant of General Lotto games introduced in Hart (Int J Game Theory 36:441–460, <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">2008</CitationRef>). We provide a complete characterization of optimal strategies for both players in non-symmetric discrete General Lotto games, where one of the players has an advantage over the...</citationref>

We consider the Hotelling–Downs model with n⩾3 office-seeking candidates and runoff voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates...

In an evolutionary model, players from a given population meet randomly in pairs each instant to play a coordination game. At each instant, the learning model used is determined via some replicator dynamics that respects payoff fitness. We allow for two such models: a belief-based best-response...

Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N K ≥ 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They...

In an oligopoly, prior to choosing quantities/prices, each firm has an opportunity to form pair-wise collaborative links with other firms. These pair-wise links defines a collaboration network. We study stable and efficient networks under different types of market competition. We find that...