We address the following questions concerning bank capital: why are banks so highly levered, what are the consequences of this leverage for the economy as a whole, and how can robust capital regulation be designed to restrict bank leverage to levels that do not generate excessive systemic risk?...

We consider a model in which banks face two moral hazard problems: 1) asset substitution by shareholders, which can occur when banks make socially-inefficient, risky loans; and 2) managerial under-provision of effort in loan monitoring. The privately-optimal level of bank leverage is neither too...

This book, written entirely by faculty at the Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, provides a variety of practical and implementable perspectives on innovation for managers. In addition, the book contains chapters that provide reviews of the academic research on innovation...

Regulators and markets can find the balance sheets of large financial institutions difficult to penetrate, and they are mindful of how undercapitalization can create incentives to take on excessive risk. This study proposes a novel framework for capital regulation that addresses banks'...

In this Paper we introduce flexibility as an economic concept and apply it to the firm’s security-issuance decisions and capital structure choice. Flexibility is the ability to make decisions that one thinks are best even when others disagree. Firms value flexibility because it allows...

Clemenz's 1993 comment criticizes our 1987 paper in two ways: first, a Nash equilibrium with rationing does not exist; second, allowing randomization across credit contracts changes the equilibrium from our 1987 paper. We respond as follows. First, our rationing equilibrium is a sequential...

This paper explores the implications of financial system design for financial innovation. We begin with assumptions about the investment opportunities of firms, their observable attributes, and the roles of commericial banks, investment banks, and the financial market. We examine the borrower's...

The main purpose of this paper is to take a step towards building a theory of financial system architecture. We begin with basic assumptions about the types of primitive agents and the nature of informational asymmetries in the economy, and then provide a theory that explains which agents...

We develop and test a new theory of security issuance that is consistent with the puzzling stylized fact that firms issue equity when their stock prices are high. The theory also generates new predictions. Our theory predicts that managers use equity to finance projects when they believe that...