We develop a dynamic industry model where financing frictions affect the entry decisions of new firms in the home market, as well as the riskiness of operating firms. These two factors in turn determine a joint endogenous distribution of firms across productivity, volatility and financial...

This paper studies the interactions between financing constraints and the employment decisions of firms when both fixed-term and permanent employment contracts are available. We first develop a dynamic model that shows the effects of financing constraints and firing costs on employment...

This article studies the interactions between financing constraints and the employment decisions of firms when both fixed-term and permanent employment contracts are available. It develops the model of an industry where firms face financing frictions and produce output using both fixed-term and...

The aim of this paper is to identify the effect of financing constraints on the employment decisions of firms. We present a theoretical model that determines the optimal use of fixed term and permanent contracts in the presence of financing constraints. We then estimate the effect of financing...

We show that long-term compensation is associated with higher pay in the financial industry and this association is stronger in markets with high competition for talent. We argue that this evidence supports models of competition for talent based on retention motives.

This paper shows how chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics affect the performance of acquirers in diversifying takeovers. When the acquirer's CEO has previous experience in the target industry, the acquirer's abnormal announcement returns are between 1.2 and 2.0 percentage points larger...

Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements...

Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements...

We study CEOs with a career background in finance. Firms with financial expert CEOs hold less cash, more debt, and engage in more share repurchases. Financial expert CEOs are more financially sophisticated: they are less likely to use one companywide discount rate instead of a project-specific...