We use the citizen-candidate model to study electoral outcomes under the Alternative Vote rule, a voting method often proposed as a replacement to the prevalent Plurality rule. We show that, like the Plurality rule, the Alternative Vote rule deters multiple candidate clusters and the presence of...

We use the citizen-candidate model to study the differential incentives that different voting rules provide for candidate entry, and their effect on policy polarization. In particular, we show that allowing voters to cast multiple votes leads to equilibria which support multiple candidate...

This paper studies the role of family size in the design of optimal income taxation. We consider a second best setting where the government observes the number of children and the income of the parents but not their productivity.

We analyse a model of coalition government in a parliamentary democracy where parties care both for ideology and perks from office, and examine how the magnitude of this tradeoff affects the nature of coalitions that form. It is shown that equilibrium coalitions can be minimal winning, minority...

How does the type of the primary system affect political outcomes? We address this issue by constructing a simple model that accounts for intra-party as well as inter-party political competition. Our model suggests that allowing non-partisan voters to participate in the primaries (i.e. a...

We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically `disconnected'. The coalitions...

The introduction of a local currency may serve as a signal of demand for local goods. Where demand uncertainty deters firms from investing in more productive technologies, such a signal improves the chances that technology choice will be optimal. The introduction of a local currency therefore...

We develop a model of favor exchange in a network setting where the cost of performing favors is stochastic. For any given favor exchange norm, we allow for the endogenous determination of the network structure via a link deletion game. We characterize the set of stable as well as equilibrium...