In this paper, we study the measurement of polarization in collective decision making problems with ordinal preferences over alternatives. We argue that polarization can be measured as an aggregation of antagonisms over pairs of alternatives in the society. We propose a measure of this sort and...

Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a new condition: “update monotonicity” for preference rules. Although many so-called impossibility theorems for the choice rules are based on–or related to–monotonicity conditions, this...

Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discussed. Here monotonicity means that if preferences update in such a way that they get closer to an outcome then at the new situation this outcome remains chosen. Strong monotonicity requires further...

Individual disagreements are assumed to be reflected in the preferences. Distance functions, e.g., the well-known Kemeny (1959) metric, are used to measure these disagreements. However, a disagreement on how to rank the top two alternatives may be perceived more (or less) than a disagreement on...

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (Games Econ Behav 72:172–186, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2011</CitationRef>) introduced two new “population sensitivity” properties...</citationref>

The excessive use of credit cards and increasing consumer borrowing has been a major problem. Laibson (1997) suggests the present-bias problem as one of the driving forces of excessive bor- rowing. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) suggest that self-control underlies national borrowing/savings rate. We...

Laibson (1997) suggests the present bias problem as one of the driving forces of excessive borrowing. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) suggest that self-control underlies national borrowing/savings rate. We conduct a survey with 65 people between the ages of 21 and 56 to check for present bias as well...

We propose an aggregation model which explains stereotype formation under the attribution hypothesis. We show, under very mild axioms, that an observer can be thought of perceiving a group in terms of her subjective opinion about the representativeness of subgroups, as well as a possible...

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (2010) introduced two new "population sensitivity" properties that capture the effect newcomers...