The paper derives a closed form solution for the maximal surplus generated by the pivotal mechanism in the case of a binary public good. The formula may be used to compare the pivotal mechanism to other mechanisms. An illustration is provided to demonstrate how such a comparison may be made.

Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is...

This paper considers a model of society [script S] with a finite number of individuals, n, a finite set off alternatives, Omega, effective coalitions that must contain an a priori given number q of individuals. Its purpose is to extend the Nakamura Theorem (1979) to the quota games where...

This paper analyzes child labor in a fully dynamic model with credit constraints. It considers the ong-run and short-run effects of an array of policies like lump-sum subsidy, enrollment subsidy, improvement in primary education and variations in loan market parameters. It is shown that some...

This paper analyzes the problem of child labor in an infinite-horizon dynamic model with a variable rate of time preference and credit constraints. The variability in the rate of time preference leads to the possibility of multiple steady states and a poverty trap. The paper considers the...

This paper introduces the concept of a waiver function of a game form: a function that measures the extent to which one can leave choice to others. This is compared with the concept of effectively function used to measure the power of coalitions within a game form. The author shows that under...