We study the determinants of the location of sub-contracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade. We model outsourcing as an activity that requires search for a partner and relationship-specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts. The extent of...

We study the determinants of the extent of outsourcing and of direct foreign investment in an industry in which producers need specialized components. Potential suppliers must make a relationship-specific investment in order to serve each prospective customer. Such investments are governed by...

Paul Romer (1986, 1990) ve Robert Lucas (1988)’in makaleleri bize; ölçeðe göre artan getirilerin mevcut olduðu bir ekonomik ortamda yatýrým gerçekleþtiðinde, sermayenin marjinal ürününün iskonto oranýna göre zamanla düþmesi gerekmediðini hatýrlatmýþtýr. Zira sermaye...

We develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility, and we prove that the principals' Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action. We apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public...

Whether governments clash in trade disputes or negotiate over trade agreements, their actions in the international arena reflect political conditions back home. Previous studies of cooperative and non-cooperative trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political...

We develop a multicountry, dynamic general equilibrium model of product innovation and international trade to study the creation of comparative advantage through research and development and the evolution of world trade over time. In our model, firms must incur resource costs to introduce new...