In this paper we model a decision maker who must exert costly effort to complete a single task by a fixed deadline. Effort costs evolve stochastically in continuous time. The decision maker will then optimally wait to exert effort until costs are less than a given threshold, the solution to an...

We study procrastination in the context of a field experiment involving students who must exert costly effort to complete certain tasks by a fixed deadline. Students display a strong demand for commitment in the form of self-imposed deadlines. However, deadlines appear not to increase task...

In this paper we model a decision maker who must exert costly effort to complete a single task by a fixed deadline. Effort costs evolve stochastically in continuous time. The decision maker will then optimally wait to exert effort until costs are less than a given threshold, the solution to...

We consider a stylised model in which two cartel members bargain over the aggregate-production quota in a world of asymmetric information. We show that when the two cartel members are sufficiently different, the probability of agreement depends on both the current state of demand and initial...

We conduct an event analysis on OPEC quota announcements to determine their impact on the stock returns in the oil industry. We find that announcements to reduce the quota are followed by positive excess returns over pre-announcement levels, announcements of no action are met with negative...

In this paper we investigate the necessary ingredients for an accurate model of belief formation. Using experimental data from a previous experiment, we bring in a new group of subjects whose job it is to predict the action choices of the subjects from the previous experiment. While the rules we...

In this paper, we use experimental data to study players' stability in normal-form games where subjects have to report beliefs and to choose actions. Subjects saw each of 12 games four times in a regular or isomorphic form spread over two days without feedback. We document a high degree of...

We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player, while the other player receives the residual from a random pie realization after subtracting the fixed payment. Contrary to the intuition that risk exposure is detrimental, we...

This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment designed to investigate whether the option of a Prize Linked Savings (PLS) product alters the likelihood that subjects choose to delay payment. By comparing PLS and standard savings products in a controlled way, we find strong evidence...