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Experimental tests of dynamically inconsistent time preferences have largely relied on choices over time-dated monetary rewards. Several recent studies have failed to find the standard patterns of time inconsistency. However, such monetary studies contain often discussed confounds. In this...
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We model religious faith as a "demand for beliefs," following the logic of the Pascalian wager. We then demonstrate how an experimental intervention can exploit standard elicitation techniques to measure religious belief by varying prizes associated with making choices contrary to one's belief...
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We develop a model of the gambler's fallacy -- the mistaken belief that random sequences should exhibit systematic reversals. We show that an individual who holds this belief and observes a sequence of signals can exaggerate the magnitude of changes in an underlying state but underestimate their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504387
This article explores some conceptual issues in the study of well-being using the traditional economic approach of inferring preferences solely from choice behavior. We argue that choice behavior alone can never reveal which situations make people better off, even with unlimited data and under...
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We develop a model that fleshes out, extends, and modifies existing models of reference dependent preferences and loss aversion while accommodating most of the evidence motivating these models. Our approach makes reference-dependent theory more broadly applicable by avoiding some of the ways...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412550
In social-learning environments, we investigate implications of the assumption that people naively believe that each previous person's action reflects solely that person's private information, leading them to systematically imitate all predecessors even in the many circumstances where rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004969132
It is traditional in experimental games to allow participants to choose only actions or possibly communicate intended play. In sequential two-person games, we require first movers to express a preference between responder choices. We find that responder behavior differs substantially according...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011131481