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Strategic Communication: An Experimental Investigation

Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884477

Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games

Farrell, Joseph - Institute of Business and Economic Research (IBER), … - 1986

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010843324

Long Cheap Talk

Aumann, Robert J.; Hart, Sergiu - Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University … - 2002

With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message - even when one side is strictly better informed than the other.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752795

Cheap Talk in Bargaining Games

Farrell, Joseph; Gibbons, Robert - Institute of Business and Economic Research (IBER), … - 1986

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010677884

Strategic information transmission and stochastic orders

Szalay, Dezsö - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

I develop new results on uniqueness and comparative statics of equilibria in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) strategic information transmission game. For a class of utility functions, I demonstrate that logconcavity of the density implies uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010570876

Strategic truth and deception

Oyarzun, Carlos; Jindapon, Paan - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2009

We study strategic communication in a sender-receiver gamein which the sender sends a message about the observed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602634

Information, Knowledge and Agency: The Information Theoretic Approach and the Austrians

Runde, Jochen - In: Review of Social Economy 60 (2002) 2, pp. 183-208

Both the Information Theoretic Economics and Austrian Economics investigate the impact on market activity of problems of information and knowledge. The conceptions of information and knowledge they employ, however, as well as their respective views on and treatment of economic agency, are quite...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005446017

Competing with Equivocal Information

Perez-Richet, Eduardo - HAL - 2012

This paper studies strategic disclosure by multiple senders competing for prizes awarded by a single receiver. They decide whether to disclose a piece of information that is both verifiable and equivocal (it can inuence the receiver both ways). The standard unrav- eling argument breaks down: if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009652974

How to Talk to Multiple Audiences

Goltsman, Maria; Pavlov, Gregory - University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics - 2008

We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of … possible that informative communication with one or both receivers is impossible in private, but possible in public. When the … by public communication with the flexibility provided by private communication and transmit more information to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515501

Communicating with a Team of Experts

Szalay, Dezsö; Arean, Ramon - Départment d'économétrie et d'économie politique … - 2005

This paper combines theories of communication with theories of expertise and teams. Facing a team of experts, who must … the cost of information acquisition. We discuss applications to task assignment, and to noisy and costly communication. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005518842