An ongoing and controversial topic of congressional scholars is the question 'Are committees 'preference outliers' vis-a-vis their parent chamber?' Despite numerous research efforts showing isolated cases of outlying committees, little evidence shows a systematic tendency for committees to be...

Elsewhere (Groseclose and Milyo <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2010</CitationRef>), we examine a game where each legislator has preferences over (i) the resulting policy and (ii) how he or she votes. The latter preferences are especially important when the legislator is not pivotal. We show that when the game follows the normal rules of...</citationref>

In this paper we estimate ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) scores for major media outlets such as the New York Times, USA Today, Fox News Special Report, and all three network television news shows. Our estimates allow us to answer such questions as Is the average article in the New York...

This paper examines the strategies that 'horse traders' and 'power brokers' adopt in trading favors to pass legislation. Although the favors that they trade are generally impossible to observe, the paper develops a model that allows tests of favor trading. With data from the Senate vote on the...

We measure media bias by estimating ideological scores for several major media outlets. To compute this, we count the times that a particular media outlet cites various think tanks and policy groups, and then compare this with the times that members of Congress cite the same groups. Our results...

Perhaps the common social choice problem that any of us face in practice is when we find ourselves in a group that must choose one restaurant at which all of us will eat. We propose a method where, similar to the I-choose-you-cut rule for dividing a cake, individuals in the group take turns...

Elsewhere (Groseclose and Milyo, 2010), we examine a game where each legislator has preferences over (i) the resulting policy and (ii) how he or she votes. The latter preferences are especially important when the legislator is not pivotal. We show that when the game follows the normal rules of...