Scheduling jobs of decentralized decision makers that are in competition will usually lead to cost inefficiencies. This cost inefficiency is studied using the Price of Anarchy (PoA), i.e., the ratio between the worst Nash equilibrium cost and the cost attained at the centralized optimum. First,...

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining...

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining...

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining...

<Para ID="Par1">In this paper sequencing situations with Just-in-Time (JiT) arrival are introduced. This new type of one-machine sequencing situations assumes that a job is available to be handled by the machine as soon as its predecessor is finished. A basic predecessor dependent set-up time is incorporated in...</para>

This discussion paper led to the publication with the same title in 'International Game Theory Review' (2012), 14(2).<P> This note provides a methodological contribution to the allocation of joint revenues obtained from passepartouts. In a passepartout system a group of service providers offers a...</p>

This paper presents an extension of the traditional bankruptcy problem. In a resource allocation problem there is a common-pool resource, which needs to be divided among agents. Each agent is characterized by a claim on this pool and an individual linear monetary reward function for assigned...