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If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818967
In this paper we provide a characterization of the set of fall back equilibria for $$2 \times n$$ bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847864
In this paper we provide a characterization of the set of fall back equilibria for <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$2 \times n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do...</equationsource></inlineequation>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999869
Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008775621
An important open problem in the theory of TU-games is to determine whether a game has a stable core (Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (1944)). This seems to be a rather difficult combinatorial problem. There are many sufficient conditions for core-stability. Convexity is probably the best known...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375639
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005409079
The paper investigates under which additional assumptions the bargaining set, the reactive bargaining set or the semireactive bargaining set coincides with the core on the class of symmetric TU-games. Furthermore, we give an example which illustrates that the property 'the bargaining set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081050
We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634524
The problem of financing a set of public goods (facilities, projects) by private contributions is studied. The corresponding cooperative game, the realization game, is shown to be convex. For the noncooperative setting we study a realization scheme that induces a strategic game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618590