This paper develops a signalling game in which the decision to raise public equity is a real option of the firm. Firms may use multiple signals to reveal their type: the timing of the IPO, the fraction of shares issued and the underpricing of shares. The model provides a tractable approach for...

The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...

The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...

The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...

R&D-intensive firms such as biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies follow very different corporate financial policies from firms in less R&D-intensive industries. To account for these differences, we propose an equilibrium model for such firms in which their capital structure, amount of R&D...

In our model multiple innovators compete against each other by submitting investment proposals to an investor. The investor chooses the least expensive proposal and when to invest in it. Innovators have to provide costly effort and they learn privately the cost of investing. Multiple efforts...

This paper considers an optimal contracting problem between an informed risk-averse agent and a principal, when the agent needs to perform multiple tasks, and the principal is active, namely she can influence some aspect of the agency relationship on top of the contract itself (i.e. capital...

An entrepreneur needs a lender`s capital input to finance a project. The entrepreneur, who is privately informed about the project environment, provides a labor input (effort). Capital and labor are perfect complements. We show that the entrepreneur may optimally distort the project`s...

An enduring puzzle is why credit rating agencies (CRAs) use a few categories to describe credit qualities lying in a continuum, even when ratings coarseness reduces welfare. We model a cheap-talk game in which a CRA assigns positive weights to the divergent goals of issuing firms and investors....

We investigate the influence which the financial condition of a multinational bank group may have on the lending rates of its affiliates, using data from the ten biggest banks in the Czech Republic under foreign control. The analysis is based on a theory of bank lending in which the implicit...