A Capital Asset Pricing Model of a stock market economy is examined under different corporate governance structures in which the objectives of managers and entrepreneurs in choosing the risk composition of their firms' returns are not aligned with those of shareholders and investors because of...

This study extends the works of Mauer and Sarkar (2005) and Andrikopoulos (2009) by incorporating a regime-dependent earnings-based bonus into managerial compensation. Examining the individual effects of ownership shares and earnings-based bonus compensation, we find that the former provides...

This paper examines how the similarity between the executive compensation leverage ratio and the firm leverage ratio affects the quality of the firm’s investment decisions. A larger leverage gap (i.e., a bigger difference between these two ratios) leads to more investment distortions. Managers...

This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we...

common explanation for why firms incur sunk costs is that technology considerations make them inescapable. This paper shows that sometimes firms may prefer to make early (less informed) investment decisions even when technology allows such decisions to be delayed. Sunk costs commit and clarify a...

Although we know there exists a simpleapproach to solve the circularitybetween value and the discount rate,known as the Adjusted Present Valueproposed by Myers, 1974, it seemsthat practitioners still rely on thetraditional Weighted Average Cost ofCapital, WACC approach of weightingthe cost of...

We develop and test a simple asymmetric information model of CEO quality, in which CEOs know their quality and shareholders may only infer this from observations of corporate profits. CEOs signal their quality to shareholders by manipulating the time path of corporate profits. Though...

This paper analyzes how influence activities in the form of signal jamming affect the capital budgeting process of corporate organizations in Australia. First, the relationship between investment in the smallest division and its past performances is tested. The relationship is defined as...

CEO incentive contracts are commonplace in China but their incidence varies significantly across Chinese cities. We show that city and provincial policy experiments help explain this variance. We examine the role of two policy experiments: the use of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract...

En Vélez-Pareja y Tham (2001), presentamos diferentes maneras de valorar los flujos de caja. Primero se utilizó el costo promedio ponderado de capital (CPPC) (Weighted Average Cost of Capital, WACC) para descontar el flujo de caja libre (FCL). Segundo, se descontó el FCL con el WACC ajustado....