We examine the equilibrium price, investment, and capital structure of a regulated firm using a sequential model of regulation. We show that the firm's capital structure has a significant effect on the regulated price. Consequently, the firm chooses its equity and debt strategically to affect...

The regulated firm's choice of capital structure is affected by countervailing incentives: the firm wishes to signal high value to capital markets to boost its market value while also signalling high cost to regulators to induce rate increases. When the firm's investment is large, countervailing...

The equilibrium price, investment, and capital structure of a regulated firm are examined using a sequential model of regulation. The firm's capital structure is shown to have a significant effect on regulated prices, so that the firm's choice of debt and equity levels refelect regulatory...

J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber examine the justifications for the publicly-protected postal monopoly and its public ownership and control.

J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber examine the justifications for the publicly-protected postal monopoly and its public ownership and control.

The European Court of First Instance, through its decision in <i>Microsoft v. Commission</i>, dealt a one-two punch to incentives to innovate. First, by penalizing Microsoft for bundling its Media Player with Windows, the court will make companies reluctant to add innovative features to their products....

The paradigm of a direct democracy in which individuals vote direclty on the issues is widely used in the recent political economy literature that explicitly models the interaction between economic and political behavior. Yet, in most existing democracies policy decisions are delegated to...