<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>This study analyzes the information conveyed by the restatements of financial reports. We argue that restatements contain news about the investment projects of the restating firms' competitors. This news causes competitors to revise their beliefs about the projects' value, and to modify...

We analyze the role of political instability for the composition of foreign investment, whether it takes the form of a majority- or minority-owned investment. We focus on the instability generated by the change of the party in power rather than on the risk of change of political regime or...

We present evidence that the political orientation of the government (left vs. right) affects corporate performance. We hypothesize that companies within labour-intensive industries polluting industries industries with high profit margins and highly leveraged industries are more sensitive to...

We examine how local and global political risks affect industry return volatility. Our central premise is that some industries are more sensitive to political events than others. We find that industries that are more dependent on trade, contract enforcement, and labor exhibit greater return...

We investigate how politics (party orientation, national elections, and strength of democratic institutions) affect stock market volatility. We hypothesize that labor-intensive industries, industries with larger exposure to foreign trade, industries whose operations require efficient contracts,...

Data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within-country variation that decreases with the strength of investors' legal protection. A simple model identifies three firm attributes related to that variation: investment opportunities, external financing, and ownership...

We investigate how predatory government policies (expropriation, lack of property rights protection, corruption, crime) interact with managerial incentives in shaping firm governance structure. Our model shows that owners have lower incentives to encourage valuemaximization by managers if the...

We propose and investigate a new channel through which the resource curse - a stylized fact that countries rich in natural resources grow slower - operates. Predatory governments are more likely to expropriate corporate profits in natural-resource industries when the price of resources is...