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Financial Experts, Asset Prices and Reputation

Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

information about the expert's ability is private to traders and only revealed through trades. When the expert's reputation is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110283

Pundits and Quacks

Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

Do asset prices aggregate investors’ private information about the ability of financial analysts? We show that as financial analysts become reputable, the market can get trapped: Investors optimally choose to ignore their private information, and blindly follow analyst recommendations. As time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240393

Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Turnover

Rothert, Jacek - Department of Economics, University of Texas-Austin - 2009

agent's initial effort has persistent effects, and on the role of reputation in models with endogenous turnover. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905941

Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning

Hu, Ju - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 64-73

This note extends Wiseman [6] to more general reputation games with exogenous learning. Using Gossner's [4] relative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930785

Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication

Jullien, Bruno; Park, In-Uck - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2011

quality items. In this equilibrium a seller's value function strictly increases in reputation and a seller's type is revealed … within finite time. The analysis highlights a new reputation mechanism based on an endogenous complementarity the market … places between a seller's honesty in pre-trade communication (trust) and his/her ability to deliver good quality (reputation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009370152

Audit contracts and reputation

Portilla, Yolanda - Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - 2009

management and the audit effort are decreasing over time because the incentives to build a reputation also decline for both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196631

Reputation in the Presence of Noisy Exogenous Learning

Hu, Ju - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

This paper studies the reputation effect in which a long-lived player faces a sequence of uninformed short …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608020

Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors

Nyarko, Yaw - In: Economic Theory 11 (1998) 3, pp. 643-655

Consider an infinitely repeated game where each player is characterized by a "type" which may be unknown to the other players in the game. Suppose further that each player's belief about others is independent of that player's type. Impose an absolute continuity condition on the ex ante beliefs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597786

The Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder: or Equilibrium in Beliefs and Rational Learning in Games

Nyarko, Y. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1998

Games with incomplete information or randomness in the moves of others typically have many decision-theoretically equivalent formulations of the type space. These different formulations correspond to different ways of encoding tha realizations of randomizations in the type of a player. Solution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005605554

Learning, Quantal Response Equilibrium and Equilibrium in Beliefs

Nyarko, Y. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 2001

This paper makes two points. First, the modeling used in the rational (or Bayesian) learning literature can be generalized to handle the repeated shocks to preferences inherent and implicit in models of quantal response equilibria (QRE). In particular, we note that the Bayesian model and the QRE...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005611707