This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of...

This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of...

Using a sample of 156 monthly returns over the period of 1996–2008, we find a positive relation between the monthly issuing size and prior market returns, suggesting that the government decides the timing and the size of issuances based on prior market conditions. Different from previous...

We examine the link between Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitoring and yield spreads on private firms' 144A bond issues. After controlling for security-specific and other firm-specific determinants, we provide evidence that debt financing is cheaper when the probability of a face-to-face IRS...

For a sample comprising 36,105 U.S. firm-year observations from 1985 to 2008, we find that firms located in more religious counties enjoy cheaper equity financing costs. This result is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including alternative assumptions and model specifications,...

This paper analyzes audit firm supervision since the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) began conducting inspections. First, we find that audit clients do not perceive that the PCAOB's inspection reports are valuable for signaling audit quality. Second, we document that the...