We augment the multi-market collusion model of Bernheim and Whinston (1990) by allowing for firm entry into, and exit from, individual markets. We show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive agreement: Collusion at the extensive margin whereby firms...

We augment the multi-market collusion model of Bernheim and Whinston (1990) by allowing for firm entry into, and exit from, individual markets. We show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive agreement: Collusion at the extensive margin whereby firms...

We provide a new model that generates persistent performance differences amongst seemingly similar enterprises. Our model provides a mechanism whereby efficient incumbent rivals can give permission for an inefficient firm to exist in the presence of efficient entrants. We demonstrate that, in a...

type="main" <p>This paper is the first to provide a general context whereby potential entry can lead incumbent firms to permanently reduce the intensity of competition in a market. All previous results found that potential entry would lead to lower prices and greater competition. Examining markets...</p>

Refor M in utility industries often involves the owner of a key essential facility selling access to that facility to downstream competitors. Examples include local telephone access and transmission or distribution system access in gas and electricity. The access price is often set by a separate...

This paper considers the effects of regulating termination for interconnected, but otherwise unregulated, telecommunications networks. We develop two models, the first that involves fixed market shares and the second, based on the work of Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a), which allows for...