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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005499671
We analyze a situation where common noise makes compensation based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) desirable, but where the agents' ability to hold-up values ex post obstruct the implementation of optimal RPE schemes. The principal can take actions to constrain the agents' hold-up power...
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When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement may reduce the worker's effort, but lead to higher-powered incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098238
When an agent is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement may reduce the agent's effort, but lead to higher-powered incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190978
The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is however hard to get empirical support for this rather intuitive relationship. This paper offers a model that can contribute to explain why this is the case. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818661
The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is however hard to get empirical support for this intuitive relationship. This paper o¤ers a model that contributes to explain why this is the case. We show that if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818854
This paper analyses and compares optimal relational contracts between a principal/firm and a set of agents when (a) only aggregate output can be observed, and (b) individual outputs can be observed. We show that the optimal contract under (a) is a team incentive scheme where each agent is paid a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010732445
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