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I propose a framework within which to interpret and evaluate the major reforms introduced to the GATT system in its transition to the WTO. In particular, I examine the WTO Agreement on Safeguards that has replaced the GATT escape clause (Article XIX), and the Dispute Settlement Process (DSP)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115151
This paper takes a mechanism-design approach to characterize a politically optimal trade agreement under the assumption that governments have private information about the fluctuating political pressure they face from domestic interest groups to restrict trade. The optimal mechanism under these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008551175
I propose a framework within which to interpret and evaluate the major reforms introduced to the GATT system in its transition to the WTO. In particular, I examine the WTO Agreement on Safeguards that has amended the GATT escape clause (Article XIX), and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008871830
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Antidumping (AD) trade protection policies allow government agencies to recalculate AD duties based on foreign firms’ most recent pricing behavior. We examine the resulting dynamic pricing problem of a foreign firm facing such policy. We show that the expected pattern of AD duty recalculations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464119
In this paper strategic R&D policy is analysed, where a firm and a firm compete in a third country with vertically differentiated ( and ) products. If the product market is under price competition, the high-tech (low-tech) firm's government has an incentive to tax (subsidize) its domestic firm's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005466996
International trade disputes often involve the WTO as a third party that generates impartial opinions of potential violations when countries receive imperfect and private signals of violations. To identify the role that the WTO plays in enforcing trade agreements, this paper first characterizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990976